Chapter 9: Clearing the borders: expulsions and population transfers, November 1948 - 1950

"In the weeks and months after the termination of hostilities, the Israeli authorities adopted a policy of clearing the new borders of Arab Communities. Some were transferred inland, to Israeli Arab villages in the interior; others were expelled across the border. The policy, which matured ad hoc and haphazardly, was motivated mainly by military considerations: The borders were long and highly penetrable. Along the frontiers of the newly conquered territories there were few, if any, Jewish settlements. Arab border villages could serve as way- stations and bases for hostile irregulars, spies and illegal returnees. In the event of renewed war, the villages could serve as soft entry points for invading armies.

At the same time, IDF, police and GSS units repeatedly scoured the populated, semi-populated and empty villages in the interior to root out illegal infiltrees and returnees. Some, such as Farradiya, sat astride strategic routes; almost all, given the State’s size and shape, were themselves relatively close to the borders. In one or two cases – vide Faluja and ‘Iraq al Manshiya in the south – the authorities expelled whole villages from sites in the interior. In general, throughout this period, the political desire to have as few Arabs as possible in the Jewish State and the need for empty villages to house new immigrants meshed with the strategic desire to achieve ‘Arab-clear’ frontiers and secure internal lines of communication. It was the IDF that set the policy in motion, with the civil and political authorities often giving approval after the fact."

The North

"A week after Operation Hiram, Carmel, with General Staff consent, decided to clear the Israeli side of the Israeli–Lebanese border of villages. On 10 November, he instructed the Ninth and Second brigades: ‘A strip five kilometres deep behind the border with Lebanon must be empty of [Arab] inhabitants . . .’ 1"

"On 10 November, Northern Front sent out the blanket order to clear the Lebanese border and, during the following months, the policy was to be implemented in staggered fashion along Israel’s other borders. It is unclear whether Carmel received specific prior support for the policy from Ben-Gurion or whether he simply drew on the blanket authorisation he apparently received from the prime minister at their meeting on 31 October. On 24 November, the Cabinet retroactively endorsed the Lebanese border-clearing operation. 7

Unlike earlier transfers, these evictions were carried out with a soft touch: The villagers were given days in which to move out and were usually allowed to take their property with them, in organized fashion. Some, such as Iqrit’s Christians, were transferred inland rather than kicked across the border (of course, filling up Rama’s empty Muslim- owned houses served the additional purpose of obstructing the return of Muslims)."

"Then, on 15–16 November, the expulsions came to an abrupt stop – even before all the designated villages had been emptied. 19 On 15 November, IDF Galilee District HQ ordered its battalions ‘to immediately stop evicting the inhabitants from the occupied villages and freeze the existing situation’.20 The following day, Ben-Gurion met with Dori and Carmel. Carmel, according to Ben-Gurion’s diary entry, explained that he had ‘had . . . to expel the border villages southward for military reasons . . . [But] he was [now] ready to freeze the situation – not to expel any more, and not to allow [those expelled] to return . . .’ Ben-Gurion agreed, and added: ‘As to the Christians in Kafr Bir‘im and other villages, [Carmel] should announce that we will willingly discuss their return, once the border was secure.’ 21 Why Ben-Gurion put a stop to the northern border-clearing operation, and why specifically on 15–16 November, is unclear. Of course, by then almost all of what had been planned had been implemented; only Fassuta (Christians), Jish (Maronites), Rihaniya (Circassians), Mi‘ilya (Christians), and Jurdiye (Muslim), within the 5–7-kilometre-deep strip, were not uprooted, the last because its beduin inhabitants, the ‘Arab al ‘Aramshe, were deemed ‘friendly’. Perhaps the ongoing ruckus over the October–November atrocities, which were linked, in various ways, to expulsions, also stayed Ben-Gurion’s hand; he was facing enough criticism in Cabinet as it was. He was particularly worried about pressure from Mapam, itself in turmoil over the atrocities, and Immigration Minister Shapira. 22 And then there were the pro- Christian lobbyists, Shitrit and Ben-Zvi, as well as pressure from clerics in Lebanon, all militating against the evictions. (A few days later Shitrit was to complain that ‘villages were being uprooted’ without his knowl- edge and that General Avner had done nothing to prevent the atrocities (and, perhaps, the expulsions).)23"

"During the last months of 1948 and the first months of 1949 there was constant infiltration of refugees from Lebanon back to the villages."

"On 27 April 1949, the government issued regulations, based on the Mandatory Emergency Regulations, empowering the defence minister to declare a border area a ‘security zone’, enabling him to bar anyone from entry. In September, the Lebanese border area was declared such a zone. 30 This legalised the previous months’ operations.

For decades thereafter, the refugees of Bir‘im (in Jish and Lebanon), Iqrit (in Rama) and Mansura (in Lebanon) pleaded with Israel to be permitted to return to their homes. They were supported by Shitrit and Ben-Zvi, president of Israel from 1952 to 1963. They also appealed to the High Court of Justice. On 31 July 1951, the High Court ruled in favour of the return of the Iqrit refugees to their village. But the IDF continued to obstruct a return. As to Bir‘im, in 25 February 1952 the High Court ruled in favour of the state, though it allowed that the initial eviction had not been completely legal. Here, too, the IDF continued to block a return and new settlements were established on the two villages’ lands. The settlements joined the IDF and GSS in lobbying against a return. The defense establishment argued that a return would harm border security, pave the way for infiltrators and serve as a precedent; the settlements, that a return, or an endorsement of the refugees’ claims to lands, would undermine their existence. During 1949–1953, natural erosion, the settlers and the IDF gradually levelled the villages.

...The case of Bir‘im, Iqrit and Mansura illustrates how deep was the IDF’s determination from November 1948 onward to create and maintain a northern border ‘security belt’ clear of Arabs. That determination quickly spread to the civilian institutions of state, particularly those concerned with immigrant absorption and settlement. Immediately after Hiram, Weitz and other executives began planning settlements in the border strip and exempted them from the ‘surplus lands’ requirement; indeed, in their planning, they tended to ‘widen’ the strip to a depth of 10–15 kilometres. However, Kaplan and Cisling, while accepting the IDF’s arguments, insisted that the evictees should be properly and comfortably resettled. Only Minority Affairs Ministry director general Machnes opposed the principle of an Arab-less border strip. 31"

"But the military periodically raided the full and half-empty Galilee villages to weed out illegal returnees, dubbed ‘infiltrators’. The authorities did not recognise the legality of residence of anyone not registered during the October–November 1948 census and not in possession of an identity card or military pass. Anyone who had left the country before the census and was not registered and in possession of a card or pass was regarded as an ‘absentee’. If he subsequently infiltrated back into the country (including to his home village), he was regarded as an ‘illegal’ and could be summarily deported. In the course of 1949, the IDF repeatedly raided the villages, sorted out legal from illegal residents and, usually, expelled returnees."

"On 21 January, General Avner proposed that the inhabitants of Tarshiha be transferred to Mi‘ilya, but political objections blocked a final decision. Matters hung fire. In March, Weitz lamented that it would be good, ‘if only it were possible,’ to empty the village so that ‘1,000 [Jewish] families’ could move in. But it was not possible: ‘The prime minister is against dealing with transfers at the moment, [and] this from an international [political] viewpoint,’ explained one of Ben-Gurion’s aides, Zalman Lifshitz. He proposed ‘to try to persuade [the inhabitants] to move.’ 40 There were also internal objections. One official explained, in a private letter to Rehav‘am ‘Amir that ‘we . . . have no right or authority to order the inhabitants of the place . . . to leave (unless they agree to this, on their own volition, and this is unlikely).’ They are ‘citizens,’ he argued, and, as such, ‘the State must protect their rights.’ No ‘security’ or ‘moral’ arguments could justify their transfer. He assumed, he wrote, that ‘all or most’ of his fellow members on the Committee for Transferring Arabs from Place to Place shared his view. 41

But the defence establishment wanted Tarshiha cleared. In light of the political obstructions, it opted for suasion rather than coercion. The pressure on the Arab inhabitants increased after the first Jewish families moved in. On 5 June, Jewish officials met with the local Arab leaders and, according to the AFSC representatives, said that the Arabs would have to move out. ‘The Arabs refused.’ The Jewish officials said that the village’s ‘115’ illegal inhabitants would be expelled from the country – unless the infiltrees and the remaining ‘600’ legal residents agreed to move to other villages or Acre. 42 But the inhabitants stayed put."

"Pressure to eject the remaining Arabs from Khisas had been building for months. Atiya Juwayid and his clan had for years provided services for the HIS and the JNF; Arabs from neighbouring Qeitiya had also apparently been of service to the JNF. But in February–March 1949, Jewish settlers and officers of the IDF Galilee District (Battalion 102) began pressing for eviction. The complaints related to general security in the area and intelligence being passed to the Syrians.

...The IDF moved on 5 June. 48 The evictions sparked outrage in various quarters. ‘This is shameful and disgraceful . . . Brutality . . . Woe to a state that treads such an immoral path,’ Yosef Nahmani jotted down in his diary.49 Nahmani, a friend of Ben-Gurion’s, for decades had enjoyed good relations with Khisas’s Arabs, who had helped him in land purchases.50 Mapam’s leaders also criticised the operation. Ben-Gurion responded that he found the military’s reasons for the eviction ‘sufficient’. Mapai’s Yosef Sprinzak, the speaker of the Knesset, sarcastically criticised the government over the operation and the post-operation explanations.51 Ha’aretz, the leading independent daily newpaper, also criticised Ben-Gurion’s justifications as ‘not very convincing’. The news- paper conceded the army’s right to move Arabs out of ‘border areas’, but such evictees must be adequately resettled, with land, houses and food. The editorial argued that this was sheer common sense as well as humanity, since to create a class of deprived and dispossessed Arabs would play into the hands of subversives bent on ‘undermining . . . the State’.52 The June evictions moved American charg ´e d’affaires in Tel Aviv Richard Ford to reflect pessimistically about the fate of Israel’s Arab minority: ‘The unhappy spectacle presents itself of some scores of thousands of aimless people “walking about in thistle fields” until they either decide to shake the ancestral dust of Israel from their heels or just merely die.’ 53 Conditions at ‘Akbara, a dumping spot for ‘remainders’ from various eastern Galilee villages, were to remain bad for years. 54"

"A last border problem remained in the north: A string of villagers in eastern Galilee, in the area that became the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) along the Israeli–Syrian border. Their presence and property were formally protected by the provisions of the Israeli–Syrian General Armistice Agreement (Article V) of 20 July 1949. 55 Nonetheless, for a combination of military, economic and agricultural reasons, Israel wanted the inhabitants of Kirad al Baqqara, Kirad al Ghannama, Nuqeib, al Samra, and al Hama, numbering about 2,200 in all, to move, or move back, to Syria. The military suspected them of helping Syrian intelligence. The DMZ inhabitants remained in the main loyal ‘Syrians’ and, under Syrian pressure, refused to recognise the legitimacy of Israeli rule. In case of renewed hostilities, they could prove strategically useful to the Syrians. As it was, Jewish settlers and police suspected the villagers of stealing cattle, tres- passing and other criminal or troublesome behaviour. 56 And, of course, the settlement agencies and settlers coveted their lands.

Most of the villagers, including from Samra57 and Nuqeib, 58 had fled or been expelled to Syria during April and early May 1948. Some of the population returned following the Syrian invasion of 16 May. More returned following the signing of the Israeli–Syrian General Armistice Agreement. During the following months, using a combination of stick and carrot – economic and police pressures and ‘petty persecution’, and economic incentives – Israel gradually evicted the inhabitants of Samra and Khirbet al Duweir. Small beduin encampments, such as that at Khirbet al Muntar, east of Rosh Pina, were periodically visited by IDF patrols and, ultimately, expelled.59 The two Kirads, though subjected to the same treatment, received UN protection and were only removed to Syria in the course of the 1956 war, though some had earlier been moved to, and permanently settled in, Sh‘ab, near Acre. 60"

"Ben-Gurion was later to say that he viewed the infiltration problem ‘through the barrel of a gun’. 63

From mid-December 1948 onward, the IDF periodically mounted massive sweeps in the Galilee villages to root out returnees and expel them.

... During January 1949, the IDF expelled in similar operations almost 1,000 Arabs and transferred another 128 to other villages inside the country.68"

"But a problem arose, as IDF officers were quick to note: After being shoved into the West Bank, many expellees infiltrated back. The operations officer of the Ninth Brigade explained:

. . . the system of expelling infiltrators to the Triangle is not very effective . . . The unit bringing the deportees lets them off the vehicles and sends them toward the border, and leaves the place. There is no one there to make sure that they will not return. In most cases the refugees move several kilometres across the border, wait until sunset and infiltrate back during the night.76

Another officer thought he had a solution, after pointing out that ‘almost all’ those expelled – all adult males – from one village, ‘Ibillin, had since returned: ‘We have not yet heard of any case in which a whole family of expellees has returned. It is clear, therefore, that the expulsion of whole families better assures their non-return.’ 77"

The South

"More ambitiously, on 11 March the IDF mounted a series of major pushes eastward, to ‘create facts’ on the ground in advance of the UN survey of the Jordanian and Israeli positions scheduled for later that day.104 The aim was to gain a little more, or tactically advantageous, territory and to drive concentrations of Arabs eastwards. But Israeli liaison officers took pains to persuade UN observers that the clashes were the result of Arab incursions and attacks:

Arab civilians with their herds go into a valley where the pastures are good . . . five kilometres west of Surif. Some of these Arabs even go between the Israeli positions with their herds. Normally, the local [IDF] commander orders small arms fire directed above their heads to scare them away. When they remain near the Israeli positions, the local commander sends out patrols to take prisoner all men of [military] age . . . This is why nine Arab civilians were taken to a prisoners camp on 11 March . . . The local commander stated that on 11 March . . . [Arab] irregulars infiltrated . . . at . . . Khirbet Jubeil Naqqar, directing rifle fire at . . . [an IDF] position . . . [and] two mortar rounds coming from Khirbet ‘Illin were directed at the Israeli position . . . On 13 March . . . a group of 25 Arab irregulars advanced from [Khirbet] Ghuraba to the Israeli position at Khirbet al Hamam. 105

In reality, the Israeli troops were ordered, in a well-organised, concerted operation, to take al Qabu, Khirbet Sanasin (southwest of Wadi Fukin), al Jab‘a, and Khirbet al Hamam, even if it involved battling the Jordanians. 106"

"Altogether, according to the UN, the IDF overran ‘35 or 36’ khurab and beduin encampments adjacent to no man’s land, expelling the inhabitants eastward. One UN report put the number of those expelled toward Dura during March at ‘7,000’. 110 But within days, UN intervention persuaded Israel to withdraw from some of the khurab, including Khirbet Sikka and Khirbet Beit ‘Awwa, and the inhabitants trickled back.

Following the signing of the armistice agreement on 3 April, a question mark arose regarding a number of villages on the southern edge of the Jerusalem Corridor. Refugees had gradually returned to both al Walaja and al Qabu, which were in Israeli territory, and the IDF wanted them empty. On 1 May, Israeli troops raided them, and the inhabitants fled and the troops blew up their houses. 111 A few weeks later, the IDF raided the village of Wadi Fukin, on the Jordanian side of the border and expelled its inhabitants. The village had been at least partially abandoned during the war and for months was in no man’s land, both sides claiming that their troops – during March–April 1949 – had occupied or patrolled it. 112 It had been partially inhabited during the winter months and ‘completely inhabited’ during the spring, according to a UN observer. But most of the houses had been demolished. 113 Around 14 April, in accordance with the territorial provisions of the armistice accord, the Jordanians had withdrawn from Wadi Fukin, though the inhabitants had remained.114 In July, the IDF drove out the villagers, claiming that they were infiltrees. 115 On 31 August, the Israel–Jordan MAC ruled that Israel must allow the inhabitants to return, the UN chairman casting the deciding vote.116 The inhabitants returned and, ultimately, the village was transferred to Jordanian sovereignty."

"Further to the south, three major problems remained. One was the Faluja Pocket (today, the site of the Israeli town of Kiryat Gat), where some 4,000 Egyptian troops had been left stranded and surrounded by the IDF between late October 1948 and late February 1949. Inside the pocket were two large villages with civilian inhabitants, Faluja and ‘Iraq al Manshiya, with a combined population of over 3,100: More than 2,000 were locals and the rest, refugees from elsewhere in Palestine. On 24 February, Israel and Egypt signed an armistice agreement. Two days later the besieged troops (who included Egypt’s future president, Gamal ‘Abdel Nasser), along with some of the refugees, departed for Egypt. But most of the civilians remained and were placed under Military Government rule, with nightly curfews and severe restrictions on movement. The Egyptians had insisted that the armistice agreement explicitly guarantee their safety. 126 In the appended exchange of letters, Israel agreed that

those of the civilian population who may wish to remain in Al Faluja and ‘Iraq al Manshiya are to be permitted to do so . . . All of these civilians shall be fully secure in their persons, abodes, property and personal effects. 127

But within days Israel went back on its word. Southern Front’s soldiers mounted a short, sharp, well-orchestrated campaign of low-key violence and psychological warfare designed to intimidate the inhabitants into flight. According to one villager’s recollection, the Jews ‘created a situation of terror, entered the houses and beat the people with rifle butts’. 128 Contemporary United Nations and Quakers documents support this description. The UN Mediator, Ralph Bunche, quoting UN observers on the spot, complained that ‘Arab civilians . . . at Al Faluja have been beaten and robbed by Israeli soldiers and . . . there have been some cases of attempted rape’. 129 The Quaker team (Ray Hart- sough and Delbert Replogle), who were at Faluja between 26 February and 6 March assessing the civilians’ food and medical needs, kept a diary. On 3 March they wrote that ‘about half the people of Faluja plan to remain’. But at ‘Iraq al Manshiya, the acting mukhtar told them that ‘the people had been much molested by the frequent shooting, by being told that they would be killed if they did not go to Hebron, and by the Jews breaking into their homes and stealing things’. On March 4, 02:30 hours, they recorded: ‘The worst barrage of shooting we had heard all week – about 300 rounds by a machinegun within a hundred yards of where we were sleeping . . .’ And at 06:30 hours: ‘The boy living in one of the rooms of our compound brought a man into the room where I was sleeping. His eye was bloody and he had other wounds on his face and ear . . . He had been beaten by “the Jahoudy”.’ The Quaker and UN observers complained to an Israeli officer. He reportedly replied: ‘They had some new recruits stationed there and . . . new recruits are the same the world over. When they get hold of a gun they want to shoot and shoot and shoot.’ "

"The Quakers said that the Arabs now wanted to leave but that sincere reassurances by Israeli officials could still persuade the Arabs to stay. No such reassurances were forthcoming. 131 The intimidation operation was orchestrated by Rabin, Allon’s head of operations. 132 Yadin dismissed the United Nations complaints of Israeli intimidation as ‘exaggerated’. 133 But Sharett, wary of the international repercussions and, especially, of the possible effect on Israeli–Egyptian relations, and angered by the IDF actions, that lacked Cabinet authorisation and were carried out behind his back, was not easily appeased. He let fly at IDF CGS Dori in most uncharacteristic language. ‘The IDF’s actions’, he wrote, threw into question

our sincerity as a party to an international agreement . . . One may assume that Egypt in this matter will display special sensitivity as her forces saw themselves as responsible for the fate of these civilian inhabitants. There are also grounds to fear that any attack by us on the people of these two villages may be reflected in the attitude of the Cairo Government toward the Jews of Egypt.

The Foreign Minister pointed out that Israel was encountering difficulties at the United Nations, where it was seeking membership,

over the question of our responsibility for the Arab refugee problem. We argue that we are not responsible . . . From this perspective, the sincerity of our professions is tested by our behaviour in these villages . . . Every intentional pressure aimed at uprooting [these Arabs] is tantamount to a planned act of eviction on our part.

Sharett added that in addition to the overt violence displayed by the soldiers, the IDF was busy conducting covertly

a ‘whispering propaganda’ campaign among the Arabs, threatening them with attacks and acts of vengeance by the army, which the civilian authorities will be powerless to prevent. This whispering propaganda (ta‘amulat lahash) is not being done of itself. There is no doubt that here there is a calculated action aimed at increasing the number of those going to the Hebron Hills as if of their own free will, and, if possible, to bring about the evacuation of the whole civilian population of [the pocket]. Sharett called the army’s actions ‘an unauthorised initiative by the local command in a matter relating to Israeli government policy’. 134 Allon admitted (to Yadin) only that his troops had ‘beaten three Arabs . . .

There is no truth to the observers’ announcement about abuse/cruelty [hit‘alelut], etc. I investigated this personally.’ 135

The decision to intimidate into flight the inhabitants of the two villages was probably taken by Allon after a meeting with Yosef Weitz on 28 February (and probably after getting agreement from Ben-Gurion). 136 A few months before, Weitz and Ben-Gurion had agreed on the need to drive out, by intimidation, Arab communities along the Faluja–Majdal axis. 137 Ben-Gurion may also have approved the action as Faluja had become a symbol of Egyptian military fortitude and courage; the expulsion of the inhabitants that army had protected would no doubt dent its reputation.138 On 28 February, Allon asked the General Staff for per- mission to evict the inhabitants. He argued that they were near the West Bank border and could serve as way stations for infiltrators, spies and guerrilla fighters, and that they sat astride a strategic crossroads. ‘I am certain that with the right argumentation and real help in transporting their property across the border we can persuade them to evacuate the villages voluntarily (in relative terms, of course)’, he argued. If, for international-political reasons, it was decided not ‘to encourage’ their departure from Israeli territory, ‘[I] recommend to transfer them inland . . .’. Allon said the matter was ‘urgent’. 139 That day, he issued an order declaring the two villages closed to unauthorised personnel, effectively sealing off the area from busybodies. 140 General Staff Division apparently approved Allon’s request, probably adding a caution concerning the visibility of the means employed.141

The fright inflicted on the pocket’s civilians in the first days of March sufficed to persuade most of them to opt for the ‘Jordanian solution’. They left for Hebron in a series of Red Cross-organised convoys. Faluja’s inhabitants all seem to have left in the first half of March"

"A second major problem in the south, as seen from the Israeli perspective, was the beduin tribes concentrated in the northern Negev. The Israeli leadership was split on the issue. There were two basic approaches. The army’s approach, at least initially, was that the beduin were congenitally unreliable and unruly, had sided with the Arabs during the war and, given the chance, would do so again. As well, they were incorrigible smugglers and thieves. It was best that they clear or be cleared out of the area. A more nuanced approach was adopted by various Arabists, who differentiated between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ beduin. The ‘bad’ ones should be ejected. But the ‘good’ ones – and beduins naturally tended to accept and display loyalty towards those in power – could be harnessed to serve the state, particularly in the form of an in situ border guard. 147

During Operation Yoav, many had moved off, some into Sinai, to be out of harm’s way. Afterwards, for more than a month, the authorities pondered the problem, undecided. At the end of October, following the clear IDF victory, a number of chieftains – led by Sheikh Suleiman al Huzeil – asked to meet the newly-appointed military governor of the Negev, Michael Hanegbi: 148 They wanted to know ‘what would be their future’.149 Ben-Gurion told his fellow ministers that he favoured ‘a peace pact with all the tribes’, implying that they would be allowed to stay. But 'the locals’, he said – presumably he meant settlers and IDF units in the area – were opposed. So meanwhile, he said, the beduin would not be allowed ‘to return to their places’. 150 On 3 November, Southern Front ordered that the beduin within a radius of 10 kilometres of Beersheba be expelled. The IDF was concerned about infiltration into town and intelligence the beduin might give the Egyptians; there was also sniping at Israeli traffic on the road between Beersheba and Bir ‘Asluj, to the
south.151 The following day, the Ninth Battalion carried out the ‘cleansing’ operation, killing a number of ‘suspicious Arabs’ and expelling one tribe.152 But beyond the 10-kilometre limit, and perhaps even inside that radius, the number of nomads steadily grew as more and more returned, reported Hanegbi. 153

On 2 November, Hanegbi and other officers met al Huzeil and several other traditionally friendly chieftains. The army, it appeared, wanted ‘to push back the beduin as much as possible from the [Beersheba] area, far into the desert’. Some officers suggested that the tribes voluntarily move ‘into Transjordan’. 154 The Foreign Ministry, previously more conciliatory, now bowed to the military, but suggested that Israel offer compensation to the departees.155 But the local Minority Affairs Ministry representative, Ya‘acov Berdichevsky, thought the tribes could be usefully turned into a border guard.156"

"Hanegbi began vigorously lobbying that Israel take the beduin under its wing. He argued that there were only ‘8–10,000’ 157 ‘friendlies’ and, dispersed over a large area, they represented ‘no danger to our plans, in terms both of security and development’. Accepting them as citizens would also look good vis-a-vis the outside world, he argued. The Foreign Ministry came round to Hanegbi’s way of thinking: It began to regard a well publicised ceremony in which the beduin sheikhs declared allegiance to the Jewish state as a boon to Israel’s efforts to parry international demands that it give up its claim to the Negev (most of which was still in Arab hands). 158 The IDF Negev Brigade, too, began to come round. On 25 November, OC Nahum Sarig informed his Seventh Battalion that ‘the tribal heads’ desire to accept Israeli protection . . . was politically important’ and en- joined the battalion not to harm the tribes or their property. 159

A ceremony of sorts duly took place on 18 November. Sixteen sheikhs offered to submit to Jewish rule and formally requested permission to stay. The officials did not respond, except to ask for the request in writing. 160 Weitz feared that important settlement and agricultural interests were being sacrificed for short-term political gain. He wrote Ben- Gurion that it was best that the beduin were not around. But, ‘if political requirements’ compelled leaving them in Israel, then they should be ‘concentrated’ in a specific, limited area. 161

It was Weitz’s line of retreat that was eventually adopted. On 25 November, Ben-Gurion met with his top Arab affairs and military advisers, including Yadin and Avner. Allon and Hanegbi favoured allowing loyal beduins to stay – but to concentrate them in an area east of Beersheba, far from the border."

"But before the ‘friendly’ beduin could be moved to the new concentration areas (soon to be known as eizor hasayig or the limited or fenced area), Israel launched Operation Horev. Between 22 December and 7 January 1949, the IDF drove the Egyptian Army out of the western Negev and surrounded most of it in the Gaza Strip. Its annihilation, in a matter of days, was only averted by forceful Anglo-American diplomatic intervention, which led to a ceasefire and Egyptian agreement to armistice talks, previously taboo, with Israel.

The new conquests resulted in the incorporation of thousands of additional beduin and to renewed movement by beduin from Sinai into the Negev. Additional tribes, including the ‘Azazme, most of which had supported the Egyptians during the war, now asked for Israeli protection (khasut) and to pledge allegiance. 164 A few months later, during Operation ‘Uvda, in early March 1949, when two IDF columns swept southwards from Beersheba and occupied the central and southern Negev down to the Gulf of ‘Aqaba (Gulf of Eilat), the troops were ordered ‘to expel all the beduin who had not accepted IDF protection [khasut] . . .’. 165 It is unclear whether any, indeed, were expelled though additional beduin certainly came under Israeli control."

"During 1949, thousands of beduin living south and west of Beersheba were moved to the concentration areas east and northeast of town. 166 But elsewhere in the Negev the paucity of security forces, the relative vastness of the area and the beduins’ migratory habits meant that Israel was left with a major and continuing problem. In January, the head of the Military Government reported ‘a massive flow’ of beduins back to Israeli-held territory; the beduins felt ‘that there was no government or supervision’. 167 Some engaged in smuggling, theft, 168 inter-tribal raiding and, occasionally, sabotage. 169 Periodically, after incidents, Israeli forces swept parts of the northern Negev, destroyed houses and tents, 170 and expelled tribes and sub-tribes.171 A major expulsion to the West Bank took place in early November, with some 1,500–2,500 beduins being pushed across the border south of Hebron. The expulsion was triggered by the murder, a few days before, of five members of Kibbutz Mishmar Hanegev. "

"During 1949, the status of the beduins granted protection – initially numbering some ‘10,000’ – remained precarious. Many had been given Israeli citizenship and ID cards; others had not. Their number continuously grew. By mid-1950, according to the IDF, there were ‘35,000’ in the Negev, ‘20,000’ of them protected. 174 Yehoshu‘a Palmon, the prime minister’s adviser on Arab affairs, wanted to restrict the number getting citizenship. He wrote: ‘In my opinion one must keep down as much as possible the number with permanent [ID] cards and to give the majority of those recently registered [only] temporary residence permits.’ 175 But the military in the Negev, no doubt with Hanegbi prodding them, sought to clarify the situation and bring closure to the problem. All the beduin given protection should be treated as ‘citizens of Israel’, wrote the Negev District HQ.176 Most apparently were."

"The last major problem in the south was the Arab concentration in al Majdal (Ashkelon), whose pre-war population had been around 10,000. Almost all had fled their homes in October–November 1948. By early 1949, due to infiltrating returnees and refugees from the area, the town had more than 2,000 inhabitants; by the end of the year, the number had swelled to ‘2,600’. 177

... Already in January 1949, Allon urged the General Staff to approve the transfer of the registered Arab inhabitants inland, to Isdud or Yibna, and the rest to the Gaza Strip. The town was ‘too close to the [Egyptian] front lines . . . [and] served as a base for enemy infiltration and for small hostile actions . . .’. 180 But Ben-Gurion turned down the request ‘for the time being’.181 When Moshe Dayan became OC Southern Command, in early November 1949, he renewed the campaign. On 14 November, Dayan submitted a detailed proposal for the transfer of the Arabs tsites inside Israel. He repeated Allon’s arguments and added that a port city for the Negev was to be built in Majdal. 182 The IDF CGS approved, adding that the town served as a way station for Arabs infiltrating to Jaffa and Ramle and ‘the Arab inhabitants of Majdal hope for the return of Arab rule to their city’.183 In December, Ben-Gurion agreed 184 and on 14 January 1950 the matter was decided, with the stipulation that the transfer ‘should be carried out without coercion’.185

The matter was not brought before the Cabinet, and it is not clear when and how Southern Command switched the prospective refugees’ destination from sites inside Israel to the Egyptian-ruled Gaza Strip. What is clear is that during the following months, the authorities, spear- headed by Major Yehoshu‘a Varbin, the military governor of Majdal, employing carrots and sticks, applied subtle and not-so-subtle pressure, and offered incentives, to obtain the population’s evacuation. Israel’s trade union federation, the Histadrut, and the Israel Communist Party tried unsuccessfully to stem or limit the transfer. Many, perhaps most, of Majdal’s Arabs, who were and felt isolated, wanted to rejoin their families, who had fled during 1948 to the Gaza Strip. The Israelis bolstered this with oppressive restrictions on movement and employment and a readiness to exchange Israeli pounds for Palestine pounds (used in the Gaza Strip) at favourable rates."

The Centre

"The purpose of most of the infiltrations was agricultural or to return home or theft; very few were terroristic. 187 But there was sporadic terrorism. A cluster of terrorist infiltrations at the end of 1948 triggered the first of the post-war IDF retaliatory strikes, on the night of 2\3 January 1949, against the Iraqi- held village of Tira, northwest of Qalqilya, and neighbouring military positions.188

The Israeli–Jordanian armistice agreement of 3 April 1949 provided for minor frontier changes, with a few small areas (in the Beisan Valley and southwest of the Hebron Hills) being transferred from Israel to Jordan, and two larger strips, along Wadi ‘Ara and between Baqa al Gharbiya and Kafr Qasim, being ceded to Israel. "

"Israel reassured the United States that nothing would happen to the villagers. Tel Aviv did not want to jeopardise the cession or damage relations with Washington. Eytan told McDonald that Tel Aviv was ‘keenly anxious’ for the villagers to stay as Israel did not wish to fur- ther aggravate the refugee situation and that if these villagers were to stay, it would serve as proof ‘to the world that [the] mass exodus [from] other [previously] captured areas was more [the] fault [of the] hysterical Arabs . . . than [of the] occupying forces’. Eytan said that the troops who would take over the ceded areas were being thoroughly briefed about how to behave. 194 A fortnight later, McDonald conveyed Acheson’s and Truman’s concern directly to Sharett. The Ambassador asked that Israel reassure the inhabitants and cautioned that harming them might damage the continuing secret Israeli–Jordanian peace negotiations. Sharett told McDonald that all would be well. 195 But Sharett’s thinking in fact took another tack altogether: We have inherited a number of important villages in the Sharon and Shomron and I imagine that the intention will be to be rid of them [i.e., the inhabitants], as these sites are on the border. Security interest[s] dictate to be rid of them. [But] the matter [in light of the American diplomatic warnings] is very complicated. 196

The cession passed relatively smoothly. There were almost no expulsions or transfers or untoward pressures. Indeed, in advance of the entry of the troops, Carmel, OC Northern Front – responsible for Wadi ‘Ara – had specifically instructed: ‘The explicit desire of the state of Israel is that no soldier will harm the Arab population . . . All . . . are obliged to careful and kind behaviour . . . in the areas passing under our control . . .’ Violators would be severely punished, he warned. 197 Identical orders were issued by OC 16th Brigade, which took over the Kafr Qasim area.198"

"Political considerations – generated by the repeated American warnings against the backdrop of the deadlocked Lausanne Conference – prevailed over the military’s desire for Arabless border areas. Apparently it was felt that there was no ‘clean’ way to ‘persuade’ the Arabs to leave."

"But an exception was made of the refugees living in and around the villages. For example, 1,200–1,500 such refugees 202 living in and around Baqa al Gharbiya on the night of 27 June were ‘forcefully and brutally’ (in Sharett’s phrase)203 pushed across the border into the Triangle. The Israel–Jordan MAC, chaired by the United Nations, investigated the incident during the following months. Israel argued that the armistice agreement protected only local inhabitants, not refugees temporarily resident in the ceded areas and that, in any case, it was the Baqa al Gharbiya mukhtar rather than the Israelis who had ordered them out. In September, the MAC – meaning its United Nations chairman – ruled in favour of the Israeli interpretation (save regarding 36 of the expellees, who were deemed permanent inhabitants who had been wrongfully expelled).

Not unnaturally, given the character of his relationship with the Israeli authorities, the mukhtar confirmed the Israeli arguments. He testified that

the village council decided for economic reasons [that the village] could not maintain the many refugees . . . and [therefore] told them to leave. No order to do this had been received from the Israeli military governor or from any other Israeli official. In certain cases, when refugees did not agree to leave, the mukhtar told them that this was an order from of the [Israeli] governor . . . (despite the fact that such an order had not been issued by the governor). 204

One Israeli analysis later explained that the refugees had left ‘under pressure from the local inhabitants’ because they had been a burden, in terms of accommodation and employment, ‘they had stolen from the local inhabitants, they had stolen from the Jewish neighbours [in neighbouring settlements], [and they had] been engaged in smuggling’. The presence of the refugees, as the Baqa al Gharbiya notables saw things, had undermined the development of good relations between their village and the Israeli authorities. 205

While the commission’s decision hung in the balance, Israel made it clear that, if forced to take the expellees back, they, the refugees, ‘would regret it’ (in Dayan’s phrase). General Riley, the United Nations chief of observers in Palestine, privately described this as ‘typical’ of Israel’s use of threats during negotiations. 206 At the same time, clandestinely, Israeli intelligence mounted a campaign to persuade the expellees now in the Triangle not to agree to return. ‘We are busy spreading rumours among the Arab refugees’, Dayan wrote to Sharett, that whoever is returned to Israel will not receive assistance from the Red Cross . . . [and] would be returning against the wishes of the Israeli government [and, therefore,] there is no chance that he would return one day to his [original] land. We therefore hope that . . . most of them will refuse to return.

In other words, IDF intelligence had disseminated the rumour that there would one day be a mass refugee repatriation but that those Baqa expellees returning ‘prematurely’ and against Israel’s wishes would ‘suffer for it’. The expellees duly told the UN investigators that they were not eager to return. Friedlander, Dayan’s deputy on the MAC, observed that ‘these rumours . . . are easily accepted by the Arabs . . .’. 207"

Conclusion

"The clearing of the borders of Arab communities following the hostilities was initiated by the IDF but, like the expulsions of the months before, was curbed by limitations imposed by the civilian leadership and was never carried out consistently or comprehensively.

Even the initial border-clearing operation in the north in November 1948, which set as its goal an Arab-free strip at least five kilometres deep, was carried out without consistency or political logic. Maronite communities such as Kafr Bir‘im and Mansura were evicted while Muslims in Tarshiha and Fassuta were allowed to stay. Intervention by ‘softhearted’ Israeli leaders, such as Shitrit and Ben-Zvi, succeeded in halting some evictions and expulsions. Consideration of future Jewish–Druse, Jewish–Circassian and Jewish–Christian relations, as well as fears for Israel’s image abroad, played a decisive role in mobilising the various civilian bureaucracies against undifferentiating, wholesale expulsions and, in some cases, changed expulsion to Lebanon to eventual resettlement inside Israel.

In terms of the army’s independence in expelling or evicting Arab communities, November 1948 marked a watershed. The Lebanese border operation was ordered by OC Northern Front, probably after receiving clearance from Ben-Gurion. It was not weighed or debated in advance by any civilian political body. Thereafter, the IDF almost never acted alone and independently; it sought and had to obtain approval and decisions from the supreme civilian authorities, be it the full Cabinet or one or more of the various ministerial and inter-departmental committees. The IDF’s opinions and needs, which defined in great measure Israel’s security requirements, continued to carry great weight in decision-making councils. But they were not always decisive and the army ceased to act alone.

The army wanted Arab-free strips along all of Israel’s frontiers. It failed to achieve such a strip on the Lebanese border (Rihaniya, Jish, Hurfeish, Fassuta, Tarshiha and Mi‘ilya remained) as it was to fail – even more decisively – along the armistice line with Jordan, west of the Triangle. With respect to the villages ceded by Jordan in spring-summer 1949, international political considerations outweighed the security arguments. Given the state of Israeli–United Nations and Israeli–United States relations against the backdrop of the Lausanne talks, Israel’s leaders found that they could not allow themselves the luxury of causing the type of friction a new wave of expulsions would have generated. The American warnings on this score had been explicit. The fact that peace talks were proceeding intermittently with King Abdullah and that Tel Aviv still hoped for a breakthrough no doubt also influenced decision-making.

In this sense, the very success of the intimidation operation in Faluja and ‘Iraq al Manshiya in early March 1949, which precipitated the flight of 3,000 or so villagers, proved counterproductive. It put the Arabs, the United Nations and the United States on alert against a repeat performance along the border with the Triangle, where there were many more Arabs.

But where politics did not interfere, the army’s desire for Arab-clear borders was generally decisive. Arab villages along the border meant problems in terms of infiltration, espionage and sabotage. When the villages were semi-abandoned, as was generally the case, it meant a continuous return and resettlement in the empty houses, thus consolidating the Arab presence in the area and increasing their numbers in the country. To this was added the interest of the Jewish agricultural and settlement bodies in more land and settlement sites and the interest of the various government ministries (health, finance, minorities) to be rid of the burden of economically problematic, desolate, semi-abandoned villages. These interests generally dovetailed.

The period November 1948 – March 1949 saw a gradual shift of emphasis from expulsion out of the country to eviction from one site to another inside Israel: What could be done without penalty during hostilities became increasingly more difficult to engineer in the following months of truce and armistice. There was still a desire to see Arabs leave the country and occasionally this was achieved (as at Faluja and Majdal), albeit through persuasion, selective intimidation, psychological pressure and financial inducement. The expulsion of the Baqa al Gharbiya refugees was a classic of the genre, with the order being channelled through the local mukhtar. But generally, political circumstances ruled out brute expulsions. Eviction and transfer of communities from one site to another inside Israel was seen as more palatable and more easily achieved.

Side by side with the border-clearing operations Israel also mounted recurrent sweeps in the villages in the interior designed to root out illegal returnees and to ‘shut down’ minimally inhabited villages (such Umm al Faraj and Bir‘im after November 1948). The aim was to keep down the Arab population as well as to curtail various types of trouble that infiltrators augured. In a narrow sense, political, demographic, agri- cultural and economic considerations rather than military needs seem to have been decisive. The presence of Arabs in a half-empty village, given the circumstances, meant that the village would probably soon fill out with returnees. Completely depopulating the village and levelling it or filling the houses with Jewish settlers meant that infiltrators would have that many less sites to return to. In complementary fashion, filling out half-empty Arab villages (as happened at Tur‘an, Mazra‘a and Sha‘b) with the evicted population of other villages meant that these host villages would be ‘full up’ and unable to accommodate many infiltrees.

Excluding the Negev beduin, it is probable that the number of Arabs kicked out of, or persuaded to leave, the country in the border-clearing operations and in the internal anti-infiltration sweeps during 1948–1950 was around 20,000. If one includes expelled northern Negev beduin, the total may have been as high as 30,000–40,000"****

Chapter 10: Solving the refugee problem, December 1948 - September 1949